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Empirical tests of the theories on the relationship between political competition and economic 
performance generate a puzzle: data tend to support the theory at the lower levels of 
government, but not in panels of countries. We argue that the larger set of policy instruments 
reduces the tax price of votes at the national level, increasing the incentives to use 
distortionary redistributive policies to win contested elections. Moreover, constitutions 
reserve competencies with a high ideological potential to the national government, reducing 
swing voters’ responsiveness to the economic performance of the central government. We 
thus expect political competition to produce efficiency-oriented policies at the sub-national 
level compared to the national one. We test this hypothesis on a panel of 24 OECD countries 
over 1974-2000 and a panel of 15 Italian regions over 1984-2000 and find support for our 
predictions. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Marshall’s Principles of Economics, economists have been trained to believe that 
market competition maximizes the welfare of the consumers, while monopoly and market 
power create economic rents for the benefit of producers. First public choice, then political 
economics attempted to import this notion into the analysis of political market, often using 
economic performance as a benchmark to evaluate the welfare properties of the alternative 
equilibria. Such ‘implant’ turned out to be a difficult one, because once one looks below the 
surface of the analogies between market structures and equilibria, a host of differences 
distinguish political markets from economic ones. Political markets reach their equilibrium 
through voting and several other processes, not just exchange; they are characterized by a 
large variety of institutional constraints, they produce a multiplicity of policy decisions, not a 
single commodity, the time profile of their processes is more complex; and the list could be 
made longer.  
The most recent theoretical formulations of this idea mark a significant advance in the 
solution of the first problem, as they use the probabilistic voting model to describe the 
political market and exploit the idea that stiffer political competition leads to the selection of 
politicians better able at resisting interest groups pressures to obtain transfers financed by 
distortionary taxation. Such ability is interpreted as a measure of the ‘quality’ of politicians; 
similarly, the degree of distortion of private choices defines the quality of the policy 
decisions. The solution to the second problem comes from the consideration that economies 
are constituted by different sectors with different levels of productivity. Since the high-
growth, it can be said that more competitive sectors are the most likely victims of 
distortionary policies, political competition enhances economic efficiency and liberates 
resources for income growth.  
The empirical testing of this argument, however, provides ambiguous results. The main 
predictions of the theory generally find support at the level of sub-national governments; but 
at the level of national governments, where the most important policy decisions are taken, the 
data seem to contradict the theory.  
The tasks of this paper are to refine the models of the literature so to provide a theoretical 
explanation of this puzzle, and to evaluate the merits of our explanation on empirical grounds. 
Specifically, our argument is that political competition alone is insufficient to promote the 
selection of more efficiency-oriented policies. Institutional constraints are also needed to 
secure an effective restriction of the politicians’ choice set that excludes low-quality policies, 
resulting in poor economic performance. These constraints are generally tighter at the sub-
national government level, insofar as constitutions generally allow sub-national government 
politicians to decide upon a smaller set of policy issues, with lower ideological potential. 
These two factors limit the discretionary power and enhance political competition at the sub-
national government level relatively to the national one and explain why political competition 
yields more efficiency oriented policy choices at the sub-national level than at the national 
one.  
The predictions of the model are then tested on two data sets, one about national political 
markets (the OECD countries), and the other about sub-national ones (the Italian Regions). A 
crucial feature of this theoretical literature is to consider political competition as a long-run, 
structural phenomenon, affected by structural events (e.g., institutional reforms), 
characterized by considerable durability, rather than as the outcome of day-to-day policy 
struggles or electoral contests. The strategy of empirical testing then revolves around the 
identification of an event that produces a permanent change in the competitiveness of the 
political market. Within the sample of the OECD countries the Fall of the Berlin Wall is the 
natural candidate for such an event, insofar as it permanently reduced the “ideological divide” 
in many countries, thereby expanding the political spectrum of parties that could compete for  3
government positions. The choice of the Italian Regions is in turn motivated by the far 
reaching institutional reforms of 1995, which transformed the government system of the 
Regions from a parliamentary to a presidential one where voters can in fact directly select 
their governor. These reforms are widely believed to have enhanced the competitiveness (and 
accountability) of Italian regional politics. They represent an appropriate testing ground for 
the political competition-economic performance nexus at the sub-national level.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the literature. Section 
3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis on the sample of 
OECD national governments, while section 5 does the same for the Italian Regions. Section 6 
reassumes the main results of the analysis, compares them with the rest of the literature and 
points out avenues for future research. 
 
2. Literature review 
Early public choice analyses of the link between political competition and economic 
performance, such as Downs (1957) and Becker (1958), set the argument for the study below. 
Competition among political parties or candidates for office maximizes voters’ welfare 
inasmuch as it reduces political rents, e.g., the tax price at which government services are 
supplied, and works as an information revealing-mechanism that improves the efficiency of 
the principal-agent relationship between voters and elected representatives. The literature that 
developed these early contributions focused on imperfections of the political market, through 
notions such as rational ignorance, efficiency losses of representation, voting and decision 
making procedures, bundling in political decisions, problems of time inconsistency in 
politicians’ incentives, as well as how alternative institutional frameworks affect the 
efficiency properties of political market equilibria. However, all these inquiries shared the 
paradigmatic conviction that more political competition enhances citizens’ welfare (Wittman, 
1989, 1995; Stigler, 1972; Barro, 1973). Even when severe inefficiencies taint the electoral 
processes and institutions, competition among interest groups shares many of the welfare 
properties of market competition (McCormick and Tollison, 1981; Becker, 1983). To further 
strengthen the argument, political economics models have shown that lopsided political 
competition engenders welfare losses, due to excessive rent seeking (Polo, 1998) and 
inefficiencies in the provision of government services (Svensson, 1998).  
At the same time, the macroeconomic literature on economic growth examined the link 
between political competition and economic efficiency from the opposite point of view, 
namely, whether greater degrees of economic efficiency, usually measured by higher income 
levels or growth rates, are correlated with more democratic governments (Barro, 1996; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). The underlying assumption is that democratic regimes are 
associated with political competition, while dictatorial ones can be taken as the analogue of a 
monopolistic political market. The predictions are ambiguous: on the one hand, greater 
political competition is usually correlated with more economic freedom, lower constraints on 
the efficient allocation of resources and accumulation of knowledge, which leads to faster 
growth. On the other hand, dictatorships are believed to redistribute less, to be better able to 
control rent-seeking, and to face a lower risk of wars of attrition than democracies - all factors 
that should induce a better economic performance, ceteris paribus. Empirical findings suggest 
a combined, nonlinear effect of democracy and freedom on growth. Increases in democracy 
raises growth at low levels of political freedom but lowers growth when moderate levels of 
freedom have been attained. Przeworski et al. (2000) find no statistical difference in growth 
performance between the two regimes, probably because it is questionable that dictatorships 
redistribute less than democracies (Wintrobe, 1998) and because the economic structure under 
dictatorships shows considerable variations, spanning market-oriented Chile under Pinochet  4
to the planned economy of the former Soviet Union. All in all, the empirical analyses support 
the greater competition-greater efficiency hypothesis only in part (Wintrobe, 2007).
1  
More recently, a series of theoretical formulations, such as Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996), 
Persson and Tabellini (2000), Besley, Persson and Sturm (2006) and Besley and Preston 
(2007) have collapsed the various arguments on the relationship between political competition 
and economic efficiency into a single model. In particular, Besley et al. (2006) summarize the 
argument as follows. Individuals usually base their voting decisions on an economic 
dimension, related to the performance of the economy during the government tenure. In some 
cases, however, they consider an ideological dimension too, based on a non-economic and 
resilient issues such as race, religion, nation and the like. When ideology is relevant, it blunts 
voters’ responsiveness to economic issues and gives a disproportionate electoral advantage (a 
political rent) to one party.
2 This lack of accountability allows the party that enjoys the 
political rent to select low-quality politicians as candidates for political offices, and special 
interest groups, antithetical to growth, to capture the political process. The economic 
consequences are policy choices targeted at redistribution rather than efficiency and income 
growth. Besley et al. (2006) test the predictions of the model on data about the U.S. States. 
They exploit the “Right to Vote” laws of 1965-1970s as an exogenous shock that destroyed 
the political rent enjoyed by the Democratic Party in the Southern States since the end of the 
Civil War, and which contributed to the ensuing growth take-off of the American South. They 
find strong empirical support for the hypothesis that tighter political competition produces 
higher State income levels and growth rates, lower tax pressure, more business friendly 
regulation and a higher quality of Governors.  
The model is at the same time comprehensive and rigorous. Furthermore, the empirical 
support it receives within the U.S. States sample is so impressive that it has already stimulated 
an empirical literature aimed at verifying the generality of the findings. This literature lends 
only mixed support to the predictions of the theories on the relationship between political 
competition and economic performance. Ashworth et al. (2006) examine the competition-
efficiency nexus in a sample of Flemish municipalities. They find that political competition 
does have a beneficial effect on the efficiency of municipality performance; these effects, 
however, are in part mitigated in that stiffer competition may lead to more fragmentation in 
governments that works against efficiency. Besley and Preston (2007) verify that mayors of 
English municipalities where redistricting measures have destroyed a political rent moderate 
their policy choices. A variation of this theory meets support also in the context of Indian 
village policies (Besley et al., 2007). However, moving up the ladder of government level, 
things seem to change. In a panel of OECD countries, Padovano and Ricciuti (2007) fail to 
find empirical support for the predictions of Besley et al. (2006) for what it concerns both 
economic performance and fiscal policy. Contrary to the evidence related to lower levels of 
government, greater political competition at the national level seems to produce worse 
economic performance and less efficient fiscal policies. When political rents are dissipated 
and offices are tightly contested, national politicians appear to resort to redistributive, rather 
than efficiency oriented policies in order to buy votes. This short run political strategy reduces 
long run economic efficiency.  
All in all, these contrasted empirical analyses propose a puzzle whose solution requires a 
more refined theoretical model.  
                                                 
1 Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) look at a large panel of countries and find that the sequence of political and 
economic liberalization matter, as countries that first liberalize the economy and then become democracies do 
much better than countries that pursue the opposite sequence, in almost all dimensions. 
2 In the framework of this theoretical structure, a dictatorial government can be taken as one where only the 
ideological dimension matters and voting is ineffective as a selection mechanism.   5
 
3. The theoretical model 
In this section we provide a modified version of Besley et al. (2006) model to illustrate 
how political competition may affect policy choices and economic performance in different 
ways at different government levels, always through the same transmission mechanism, 
namely, the quality of politicians and the type of policy choices. Our innovation is 
concentrated on the differences between national and sub-national levels of government and 
on the way these differences affect fiscal policies and economic performances. We opt to 
present the whole theoretical structure here, to better show how our contribution fits into the 
general theoretical structure.  
Political competition in any government level is characterized by two parties that select 
candidates for the elections of the President of the national government and of the sub-
national ones. Both national and sub-national elections are held according to the same 
institutional procedures. The population is composed by two groups of citizens, one that work 
in a traditional sector, the other that draw income only from a technologically advanced 
sector,
3 with no differences of composition between the various sub-national units.
4 The 
elected President decides the policies and redistributes resources among the two sectors to 
maximize his/her political returns. Those who work in the traditional sector protect their 
quasi-rents by lobbying. They are more successful at capturing the government the more 
uneven is political competition, the lower is the ‘quality’ of the President and the greater is 
the set of policies that the President controls. The constitution divides the political 
competencies of the national and the sub-national governments, avoiding overlaps. This 
demarcation generates two sources (or channels) of differences between the two government 
levels in the impact of political competition on economic performance through two separate 
channels.  
First the constitution assigns administrative tasks, with low ideological potential, to sub-
national governments and reserve political ones, with higher ideological potential (such as 
foreign policy or income redistribution), to the national government (Alesina and Tabellini, 
2007; 2008). In the model this is captured by a parameter that determines two intercepts in the 
function relating political competition to economic performance, one the national 
government, the other for sub-national ones. Second, the constitution allows the national 
government to raise revenues through a higher number of tax instruments relative to those 
assigned to the sub-national ones, thereby reducing the incidence of each fiscal levy per equal 
amount of expenditures to be financed and, because the excess burden of taxation increases 
with the square of the effective tax rate, decreasing the overall distortions of private choices. 
National presidents have thus a lower cost of redistributing resources to buy votes than 
presidents of sub-national governments. The lower tax price of votes relaxes a binding 
constraint on the incentives of national politicians to fight contested elections by selecting 
more distorsive policies, thereby decreasing the efficiency enhancing properties of political 
competition at the national level relative to the sub-national ones. The model describes this 
difference by means of a coefficient on the redistributive costs of policy choices of national 
governments that takes different values according to the government level. As a result there 
                                                 
3 In Besley et al (2006) the traditional sector is represented as agriculture and the modern one as a capital 
intensive activity, but as Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) show, the logic of the argument is however applicable to 
any economy where a group of industries is less productive than another. 
4 If we allowed the subnational jurisdictions to differ in the shares of the technologically advanced and 
traditional sectors in their economies, we would add another dimension of redistribution, which would only 
reinforce the logic of the argument. Padovano (2007) provides such a model.   6
will be two different slopes of the political competition-economic performance function for 
the two government levels.  
Aside from these differences, the structure of the model is essentially the same as in 
Besley et al. (2006). Political competition improves economic performance only to the extent 
that it is not lopsided. The distortion consists in an electoral advantage of one party arising 
from a surplus of committed voters. This surplus is in turn generated by one party’s advantage 
in representing a set of non-economic, resilient issues, called ideology, which can be thought 
of as race, religion, nation and the like. In a sub-national government context such as the 
American South race provides the ideological dimension; at the level of national government 
in many countries, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the example could be an anti-Communist 
ideological stance. The degree of political competition increases as this ideological 
dimension, and the annexed electoral advantage, looses importance. When it exists, however, 
such electoral advantage reduces the dominant party’s incentive to appeal to swing voters, 
who are not committed on ideological issues and are prepared to vote against candidates more 
interested to cater lobbies. Given the relatively lower price of votes, at the national level the 
incentives to appeal to swing voters to win the elections decrease more rapidly per equal 
increase of salience of the ideological, lobby-sensitive issue, thus making the national 
political market less prone to promote economic efficiency than the sub-national one. 
Furthermore, as sub-national governments decide upon less ideologically sensitive issues, 
voters interested in protecting their economic rents by lobbying will find it less costly to ‘buy 
off’ national politicians. Also for this reason, national politicians will be less pro economic 
growth than sub-national ones.  
The timing of the model is the traditional one of probabilistic voting models. First, each 
party picks a candidate for President (for both government levels) under uncertainty about a 
popularity shock. Second, this shock is realized as voters vote. Third, whoever is elected 
President at both government levels receives transfers from vested interests and selects a set 
of policies. At the last stage, private economic choices are made, which yield economic 
outcomes conditioned by the policies chosen at each government level. The next three 
subsections deal with these choices in reverse order. Thus, we first describe the economic 
model, then the political model, and finally the full politico-economic equilibrium for both 
economic levels. 
 
3.1. The economic model  
Two sectors (traditional and advanced) and two periods characterize the economy. The 
key questions for the politics-economic nexus are how those who work in the traditional 
sector can protect their quasi-rents now and how such protection affects economic growth 
later. Within a finite population of size M, each citizen differs in their economic and political 
type. Political types are discussed in the next subsection. Economic types, denoted by 
{} L K I , ∈  refer to the ownership of factors of production. One group,  K I ≡  has  M ) 1 ( α −  
members, who work only in the “new” sector N. The other group,  L I ≡  with size  M α , 
works in the traditional sector T and is endowed with the same amount of traditional factor of 
production l,  α / l . In period 1 every citizen has the same endowment, y1, which can be 
consumed or invested in either of the two sectors  { } N T S , ∈ . The period 1 budget constraint 
of an individual from group I is thus  1
, ,
1 y k k c
N I T I I = + +  where 
I c1  is his first-period 
consumption and 
T I k
,  and 
N I k
,  are his investments in the traditional and new sector, 
respectively. In period 2, the same consumption good can be produced with two different 
technologies, associated with the two different sectors of production. In the new sector, 
production requires only capital and takes place according to a linear technology 
N N MAk Y = , where 
N Y  is output of the new sector and k
N per capita investment in the new  7
sector. The traditional sector instead has a well-behaved, constant-returns-to-scale production 
technology ) , ( l k MQ Y
T T = , where 
T Y  is output of the traditional sector, and k
T per-capita 
investment in the traditional sector.  ) , ( l k Q
T  is assumed to be increasing in both arguments 
with 0 < kk Q , 0 < ll Q  and  0 > lk Q . 
A citizen in group I evaluates economic outcomes by the quasi-linear utility function 
I I I c c H V 2 1 ) ( + =  where 
I
j c  is consumption in period j and  0 > c H , while  0 < cc H . Relative 
profitability of capital in the two sectors will be affected by a host of different policies, 
including regulatory, industrial, labor market, and commercial policies, financed by an array 
of tax instruments  j τ . These policies and associated tax instruments are exclusive competence 
of either the national or the sub-national government levels, and are thus decided exclusively 
by the respective President, with the President of the national government having more 
competencies (and, as we shall see later, more ideologically sensitive ones) than the sub-
national Presidents. A coefficient β , set at  1 > β  for the national government and at  1 = β  
for the sub-national ones, captures the larger set of policy instruments that the constitution 
assigns to the national government. To simplify matters, we assume that there is no difference 
between the effective incidence of these different taxes  j τ , i.e., the national President set 
them all at the same level  1 0 ≤ ≤τ , and all on the output of the new sector. The per-capita tax 
proceeds 
N Ak βτ  are distributed as an equal lump sum transfer f to every individual in the 
economy. The period 2 budget constraint of an individual from group I is thus 





N I I + + + − =
, ,
2 ) 1 ( βτ  where l
I denotes per-capita holdings of the traditional 
factor in group I; furthermore we have exploited that in equilibrium the reward to each factor 
equals its marginal product. Importantly, the period 2 budget constraint shows that, for any 
level of f, the national government can set taxes at a lower rate, due to the higher level of β . 
Per policy, this reduces the tax price of redistribution at the national level.  
When savings and investments are chosen, the overall level of tax incidence βτ  is 
already known, because economic choices are made after political ones. Optimal economic 
decisions imply that in (an interior) equilibrium:  
) , ( ) 1 ( ) (
, ,
1 l k Q A k k y H
T
k
N I T I
c = − = − − βτ .          ( 1 )  
The equilibrium condition shows that each person invests the same amount 
N I T I I k k k
, , + = , irrespective of whether he owns any amount of the traditional factor, and, 
since marginal rates of return are equal, individuals are indifferent between the two forms of 
investment.
5  
Two are the key results of the economic model for the growth rate and the structure of the 
economy. First, the growth rate (of GDP and GDP per-capita):  




1 2 − + − =
−




T T βτ βτ βτ βτ       (2) 
is a decreasing function of the tax pressure on the modern sector βτ , since tax pressure 
depresses growth because it distorts the accumulation as well as the allocation of capital 
between the two sectors. Second, the share of the modern sector in period 2 output:  







), ( ( )) ( ) ( (
)) ( ) ( (
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= =         ( 3 )  
                                                 
5 See Appendix A for a characterization.  8
is also a decreasing function of tax pressure on the modern sector. Because of the difficulties 
in identifying the less advanced productive sector in a panel of countries, in this paper we will 
test only the first prediction.  
 
3.2 The political model  
As mentioned above, each citizen has a political type P, defined by the utility obtained 
from non-economic issues. As in Persson and Tabellini (2001) we distinguish three types: 
Centre Left, Centre Right and Independents,  { } 0 , ,CR CL P =∈ . This characterization applies 
at both the national and sub-national political market. Partisan voters, who vote invariantly for 
one party, make up a share  σ − 1  of the population. Let  Δ ) , ( p P δ  be the utility gain of a 
partisan from having his preferred political type, p, in the President office. Only the Centre 
Left and the Centre Right are organized in parties that select candidates for the office of 
Presidential of the national and sub national government(s),  { } CR CL p , ∈ . Thus, we set 
0 ) , ( ) , ( = = CL CR CR CL δ δ , and  1 ) , ( = P P δ . As explained below, independents also care 
about the parties’ stance on non-economic issues, but to a smaller degree than partisans.  
The political model involves three types of players: 1) interest groups, 2) political parties 
and elected Presidents, and 3) voters.  
1) Interest groups. Agents who benefit from the use of capital in the traditional sector 
become vested interests, as they have a stronger incentive to get organized in order to protect 
their quasi-rents. In sectors based on new technologies, where no such rents exist, interest 
groups are more costly to form. We thus assume that only the group L (individuals belonging 
to the traditional sector) lobbies the elected President and his party, by paying a per member 
transfer t in exchange of policy favors. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the group L 
only consists of ideologically motivated citizens from both parties. As all members own the 
same amount of the traditional asset, we also assume that there is no policy conflict within the 
group. The utility level of the representative interest-group member, at the point of lobbying, 
is:  t l R F t V t V
L L P −
−
+ = − = ) (
1




βτ βτ βτ . 
2) Parties and Elected Presidents. Each of the two parties, CL and CR, comprises a small 
fraction of ideologically motivated citizens, with  { } CR CL P , ∈ . Parties pick candidates for 
President of the national and sub-national governments among their members. After the 
election, the candidate elected President decides the level of overall policy incidence βτ  
(with  1 = β  at the sub-national government level) and decides how much transfers to take 
from the special interest. Elected candidates share any transfers they receive with party 
members, according to a fixed rule where the party’s share is given by ρ  (where 
M / 1 1− < ρ , to rule out trivial results). Party members differ in the amount of “shame” they 
attach to any bribe received. Let q, with  1 0 ≤ ≤ q  denote the discounting due to shame, so a 
unit of transfers has value  q − 1  to a politician. As a higher shame reduces the value of a 
bribe, the parameter q measures the “quality” of a candidate. The utility of the average party 
member when the policy is βτ  and transfers are t is: 
( ) α δ βτ βτ
ρ t q p P V t V
P
m
K P ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ) , ( − + Δ + = .
6 Selecting a candidate for Presidential office 
thus amounts to picking a type qp, which affects the level of t if the election is won by party P.  
3) Voters. The two groups are defined by the political types above. A share  σ − 1  of the 
population, the types  {} CR CL P , ∈ , strongly prefers one of the parties due to non economic 
                                                 
6 For a derivation of this utility function see Appendix B.  9
issues. We assume this preference to be strong enough that committed citizens vote for their 
preferred party no matter what; in the lexicon of the model, their utility gain Δ is large enough 
to dominate any economic concerns. Of these committed voters, a fraction () 2 / 1 λ −  prefers 
party CL. To fix ideas on the Italian sample, during the so-called First Republic we think 
about Catholic religion and anti-Communist ideology as the salient non-economic issue and 
the Christian Democrats (here the CL party) as having an advantage among the committed 
voters in this dimension, i.e.,  0 > λ . Other examples could be taken from France, Germany, 
Japan.  
The remaining share σ of voters are independent, type  0 = P , swing voters. Here the 
differences between the national and sub-national political markets become relevant, for two 
reasons. First, the assumption that all owners of the traditional asset are partisans implies that 
all swing voters are owners of the new asset. Thus, the economic payoff to a swing voter of 
having party  {} CR CL p , ∈  in office is  ) ( p
K
p V v βτ = . This payoff increases with β and 
decreases with τp, since a higher number of policy decisions at the national level allow the 
President of the national government to reduce the incidence of each policy τp (and associated 
excess burden) to raise a given amount of resources compared to a President of a sub-national 
government that has to fulfill the same task. In addition, swing voters have an individual party 
preference,  [] ) , 0 ( ) , 0 ( CR CL δ δ ω − , for or against party CL’s relative stance on non-economic 
issues, with  0 ≤≥ ω  distributed among the voters. A swing voter casts her ballot for party CL 
whenever 0 > − + + CR CL v v ω η  where η is an aggregate popularity shock. If  ω G  denotes the 
conditional density function for ω , it is easy to show that party CL wins when 
() [] 0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 > − + − − − − λ σ βτ βτ η σ ω CR CR CL CL v v G .  
The ) ( ) ( CR CR CL CL v v βτ βτ −  in the previous equation reveals one channel through which 
political competition at national level can be distinguished from that at the sub-national level. 
To the extent that  1 > β , the national President can raise a given amount of revenues at a 
lower tax rate τ , thereby resorting to less distorsive policies compared to the President of a 
sub-national government. This lowers the  ) ( ) ( CR CR CL CL v v βτ βτ −  differential for swing voters 
at the national level than at the sub-national one, making them less sensitive to differences in 
economic performance delivered by the two parties at the national level. Hence swing voters 
will be less decisive in national elections. The national political market will thus be less prone 
to economic efficiency than the sub-national one. There a tax rise distorts private choices 
more and trigger a greater response of swing voters.  
The support of the ω  distribution conveys the relative salience of the ideological issue 
and the second dimension through which political competition at the national and sub-national 




2 2 , − , where 
the parameter γ  indicates whether the issue is decided by the central government ( 1 > γ ) at 
by the sub-national one ( 1 = γ ). This parameterization captures the typical division of labor 
between government levels, whereby the national government deals with issues characterized 
by a higher ideological potential, while the sub-national governments are assigned 
administrative tasks with lower ideological potential. The parameterφ , on the other hand, 
indicates the relative salience of non economic issues among swing voters, with a higher 
value of φ  capturing lower salience. Finally,  Δ < φ
γ
2 ; all swing voters have weaker 
preferences on non-economic issues than the partisan voters. We may use the support of the 
ω  distribution to gauge the relative salience of non-economic issues among the swing voters.  10
Under this parameterization, the condition for a Centre Left party win becomes 
[] 0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( > − + − − λ σ βτ βτ η
γ
φ
σ CR CR CL CL v v , corresponding to the following critical value of 










is the key measure of (lack of) political competition. To further simplify the algebra, let η be 
uniform on [ ] ξ ξ 2
1
2
1 , − . We assume that parties pick their candidates for President knowing the 
distributions of ω  and η, but not the realization of η. At that point in time, the probability of 
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κ       ( 4 )  
Hence, this probabilistic voting model predicts the electoral success of the Centre Left to 
primarily depend on two conditions. One is the degree of political competition κ , with higher 
level of competition (κ  closer to 0) reducing the probability of success of the Centre Left 
party. The other is the utility difference for swing voters resulting from the policies pursued 
by the Centre-Left and Centre-Right candidates,  ) ( ) ( CR CR CL CL v v βτ βτ − . These conditions are 
in turn affected by the following factors:  
1.  As λ falls, the Centre Left’s advantage in terms of committed supporters decline; 
2.  As  σ  becomes large, i.e., swing voters make up a larger fraction of the voting 
population and the Centre Left advantage declines; 
3.  As φ goes up, the salience of non-economic issues among the swing voters decreases 
and the Centre Left advantage declines; 
4.  As  γ   increases (decisions are taken at the level of national government) the 
ideological potential of non-economic issues among the swing voters increases and the 
Centre Left advantage rises; 
5.  As β rises, policy decisions are taken by the national government, where the tax price 
of redistributing resources is lower. The economic payoff to a swing voter of having a 
party or another diminishes and the Centre Left advantage rises. 
Post election politics. The candidate and party winning the election is described by the 
pair  { } p qp, . In the post-election lobbying game, suppose the elected President can make a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the interest group. But the reservation utility of an interest group 
member cannot fall below the utility of the owner of a new asset (otherwise the interest group 
member would trade the traditional asset for the new one), so that  l R F V
K ) ( ) ( ) ( βτ βτ βτ − = . 






= . In other words, the rent from holding the traditional asset is fully 
captured and transferred to the President and his party. Since  0 > τ R , higher taxes go hand in 
hand with higher transfers.  
The President’s ex post payoff is  1 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( − − + + + Δ + M q l R F p ρ βτ βτ . Since there is 
no commitment in policy, the equilibrium tax rate is the ex post optimal tax rate for the 
elected President, i.e.,  { } 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( max arg ) (
] 1 , 0 [
− − + + + Δ + =
∈
M q l R F q p p ρ βτ βτ τ
τ
. It is easy 
to show that  ) ( p q βτ  is a declining function. Higher quality Presidents attach less value to 
transfers and are less prone to exchange money for policy favors to vested interests.  11
Pre election politics. The main check on rent extraction by parties is the contest over 
swing-voter support. Effectively, parties compete by offering equilibrium utility levels of 
their candidates to the swing voters that are made ‘incentive compatible’ by picking 
Presidents who deliver such policies. The range of utility levels [ ] v v,  a party can credibly 
offer, however, depends on the range of possible Presidents.  
We can now write the pre-election maximands of the Centre Left party: 
[ ] ) ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( CR CR CL CL CR CR CL CL CL CR CR v v W v v P v βτ βτ βτ βτ κ βτ − + Δ − + +  
and the Centre Right party: 
[ ] ) ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( CR CR CL CL CR CR CL CL CL CR CR v v W v v P v W βτ βτ βτ βτ κ βτ − + Δ − + − + Δ   
where we have used that party members obtain the same utility as ordinary capitalists if 
their party does not gain office. 
The trade-off facing parties should now be clear. Offering a higher utility to the swing 
voters - i.e., picking a higher quality Presidential candidate (someone with higher qp) - they 
raise their chance of winning. This, however, reduces the rents they capture if winning (βτ  
and hence t will be lower). This trade-off is stronger at the sub-national government level than 
at the national one, because a lower β  forces the President to set a higher τ  at any level of t. 
An incumbent Centre-Left President of a sub-national government is therefore more 
constrained to use redistribution to secure his electoral advantage than his national 
counterpart. This makes the sub-national political market more prone to economic efficiency 
than the national one, a key prediction of our model.  
The full politico-economic equilibrium reveals how this trade-off is resolved by party 
strategies. The only difference between the parties is captured by κ , which measures the 
extent of political competition. As we will see, because  0 > κ  the Centre Left (more 
generally, the party with an inherent electoral advantage) is less pro-growth. Intuitively, a 
party with a larger set of committed voters is tempted to pick politicians who care more about 
rents, protect the rents and the size of the traditional sector, and thereby retard growth. Again, 
because 1 > γ  is a directly related to the value of κ , the political rent is more resilient at the 
national level than at the sub-national one, and the ideological party will find it easier to 
implement growth retarding policies at the national level.  
 
4. Empirical analysis, OECD sample 
4.1. Empirical strategy 
The empirical verification of the model requires two key variables and two samples. The 
variables are an indicator of political competition κ  and a shock to it, which modifies the 
long run competitiveness of the political market. The two samples must refer one to national 
governments, the other to sub-national governments, and must allow the estimate of the same 
equations, to verify the hypothesized differences of the political competition-economic 
performance at the two government levels.  
In this section we test the predictions of the model in a sample consisting of data drawn 
from 24 national governments of OECD countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USA, 
and United Kingdom. The sample ensures a broad degree of homogeneity of economic 
conditions; furthermore, all these countries are democracies. Limitations in the data sources 
constrain the sample period to the 1974-2000 time interval.  
The empirical literature that tests implications close to our model uses indicators of 
electoral bias as a measure of degree of political competition. Specifically, Besley et al. 
(2006) use the difference between the dominant party’s electoral advantage relative to the 
mid-point of 50% of two-party vote support in their study of elections in the U.S. States.  12
Ashworth et al. (2006) employ the margin between the first and the second largest party in 
their sample of Flemish municipalities. The first measure is more suitable in a two-party 
political system, but the countries and the regions in our samples typically include more than 
two parties and have a variety of government and electoral systems. We then resort to the 
margin between the first and the second largest party in parliamentary and/or presidential 
elections, according to the system. In majoritarian systems the two largest parties typically 
compete for the government, in proportional representation systems the two largest parties 
usually lead the coalitions that alternate in office. The source of this variable is the Database 
of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001). An alternative measure of the lack of political 
competition could have been the durability of government, based on the idea that a party with 
an ideological advantage enjoys a political rent which ensures a longer grip on government 
positions. This interpretation of such an indicator is ambiguous, as it would not distinguish the 
case of a government that performs well in a highly competitive political market and is 
reelected by voters. We have therefore opted for the margin between the two largest parties; 
yet, as we shall see below, we also use a battery of control variables to account for the effects 
of institutional differences on political competition as much as possible.  
As we discuss in detail below, the theoretical literature reason in terms of long run 
structural events, not short run electoral outcomes because measures of political competition 
are not necessarily exogenous to the outcome variables that describe economic performance 
The usual strategy in this case is to construct instruments for political competition that are 
independent from the economic performance of the countries/states included in the sample. In 
the context of the OECD countries finding such an instrument is particularly difficult, as the 
usual ones employed for sub-national governments (institutional reforms, redistricting, 
extensions of the power to vote) become unavailable. What we need is an event that a) 
occurred in a definite moment of time; b) simultaneously affected the degree of 
competitiveness of the political markets of the OECD countries; c) is uncorrelated with the 
indicators of economic performance. As an instrument only the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
demise of Soviet Union meets all these requirements. These events reduced ideological 
polarization in countries with strong Communist Parties and increased political competition. 
According to our index, political competition in the 1974-1989 period was equal to 0.2577, 
and in the period 1990-2000 was equal to 0.2655. Figure 1 shows the log of political 
competition in all countries of our sample before and after 1989. 
Furthermore, this index does not appear to be positively correlated with per capita 
personal income, which would make it an unsuitable instrument: the relationship is negative 
in 18 cases, positive in 5, absent in 1. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between the index and 
per capita income for the overall sample, showing the lack of any correlation between the two 
variables. The institutional differences between countries may affect the degree of political 
competition: a 2% margin in a presidential system allows a much firmer position in 
government than in a parliamentary system; furthermore, two party competition is 
categorically different from competition among coalitions of parties. We have therefore 
considered a battery of control variables, including the degree of fractionalization of 
government coalitions, an indicator of whether the party/coalition supports the government 
has the majority in both Houses of the Parliament, a multivariate dummy that represents the 
government system (presidential, parliamentary or mixed), a dummy for the electoral system 
(majoritarian or proportional); finally, following La Porta et al. (1999) we have also 
considered the legal origins of the country (French, German, or UK). Table 1 gives the 
summary statistics of the variables involved in the analysis.  
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Figure 1. Political competition before and after 1989 
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Table 1- Summary statistics, OECD sample 
 
 
4.2. Income equation  
The baseline specification for estimating relationship between political competition and 
economic performance (model 1) is: 
it t i it it it y ε θ ϑ α κ α + + + + = Z 2 1          (5) 
where  it y  is personal income per capita of country i in year t;  it κ  is measure of political 
competition, Zit is a vector of institutional controls,  i ϑ  is country fixed effects and  t θ  is a 
year dummy. The models are log linear. We use a battery of control variables to clean the 
estimates as much as possible: institutional and political differences, and legal systems.  
In Table 2 we consider the relationship between political competition and the level of real 
personal income. When we simply regress lack of political competition on income (column 1) 
we find that the variable is insignificant. This result is not conclusive, because the coefficient 
α1 gives us the causal effect of political competition on yit as long as  it κ  is uncorrelated with 
it ε . In the context of our analysis, this condition may fail because of omitted factors 
influencing both economics and politics. In certain countries the Fall of the Berlin Wall may 
have destroyed pre-existing political rents and increased competition because the demise of 
the Soviet Union made voters feel that voting for a left-wing party no longer involved the risk 
of changing the set of national alliances. Furthermore, as already pointed out, it could also be 
the case that higher income stimulates political competition, thereby rising problems of 
reverse causation. To solve these potential problems, we resort to an IV strategy, using the 
year after the Fall of the Berlin Wall (1990) as our instrument. Specifically, Berlin is a 
dummy that takes the value of 0 from 1974 to 1989 and 1 afterwards. The IV strategy also 
addresses another possible bias in the estimate of α1. Our measure of political competition, the 
margin between the first and second major contestants in the elections, fluctuates temporarily 
from one election to the next. These short-run fluctuations will poorly approximate the 
comparative statics of  it κ  in the model, which correspond to long-run changes in the degree 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max 
Per-capita  income  4.094 0.272 3.065 4.572 
Growth rate  1.917  2.618  -9.753  10.748 
it κ  (lack of political competition)  0.258 0.095 0.000 0.951 
Fractionalization  0.673    0.119 0.000 0.897 
Control of all Houses  0.197   0.398  0.000  1.000 
Majoritarian   0.472   0.499  0.000  1.000 
LegOr  UK  0.200 0.400 0.000 1.000 
LegOr GER  0.177        0.382  0.000  1.000 
LegOr  FRA  0.399 0.489 0.000 1.000 
Openness  62.455    30.114 10.530 184.19 
Investment(-1)  24.289    4.8346 8.7286 42.167 
Government spending  17.232   4.0395  6.9093  27.950 
Share of the Elderly  12.516   3.341  3.710  18.071 
(Lack of) Political comp. 1
st  quintile    0.0085  0.092 0.000 1.000 
(Lack of) Political comp. 2
nd quintile  0.131   0.338  0.000  1.000 
(Lack of) Political comp. 3
rd  quintile  0.667 0.471 0.000 1.000 
(Lack of) Political comp. 4
th    quintile  0.144 0.351 0.000 1.000 
(Lack of) Political comp. 5
th    quintile  0.047 0.212 0.000 1.000  16
of electoral competition. An IV strategy relying on an external shock to the competitiveness 
of the political markets of the OECD countries holds the additional advantage of removing the 
downward bias associated with such measurement error. Given the nature of the variables 
(lower margins indicate greater competition) this bias may be responsible for the ‘wrong’ sign 
obtained in OLS estimates. We thus consider a first-stage equation (model 2): 
it t i it Berlin d c η β κ + + + = 1         ( 6 )  
where  i c  is a region fixed effect and  t d  a year fixed effect. Results from the IV 
version corresponding to (mod.1), using (mod.2) as the first stage, are found in column (2). 
The lack of political competition then becomes significant at the 1% level and positive. 
Significantly, this is in contrast with the rest of the literature, but consistently with what our 
model predicts for the national government level. In column 3 we add the legal origins of 
common law (UK) and continental law (France and Germany). Legal origins are credited to 
induce different degrees of competition and accountability in the economic systems, therefore 
affecting economic performance. Yet these variables do not change the sign of our measure of 
political competition. Our political competition measure is based on the distribution of seats. 
We then need to control for variables that affect how votes are transformed into seats. In 
columns 4 through 7 we consider three aspects that can affect political competition. In this 
analysis we are considering two-party and multi-party political systems, and accountability 
may be lower in the latter case, making it more difficult for voters to punish bad politicians. 
First, we introduce fractionalization, the probability that two legislators picked at random 
belong to different parties. In the war of attrition literature (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) this 
variable is negatively related with government responsiveness to adverse shocks to the 
economy. Second, we consider whether the coalition supporting the government control both 
Houses (if there is more than one Chamber). If the two Houses are controlled by different 
majorities, decisions may need further bargaining between political groups, and the fact that 
the government has the majority in only one Chamber may signal that the electoral race is 
extremely tied or that the distribution of seats leads to a head-to-head situation. Third, we 
introduce a dummy variable to control for a majoritarian voting rule, which determines a two- 
or three- party political environment with one party supporting the government, compared 
with the multi-party system of proportional representation that lead to coalitions supporting a 
government.
7  
Adding these variables does not modify the negative sign of the political competition 
variable. In columns 8 and 9 we address the issue of possible non-linearity in the relationship 
between political competition and income. In the former we add a variable that multiplies the 
lack of political competition with a dummy variable for the countries (France, Italy and 
Spain) in which their communist parties formed an alliance called Euro Communism. These 
parties were larger than in other countries and this might have affected political competition. 
There is a marginal effect on the size of the coefficient of the variable measuring the lack of 
political competition, but it still remains significantly positive at the 1% level. Finally, in 
column 9 we substitute the continuous measure of political competition with a dummy for 
each quintile. Only the quintile with the highest values of lack of political competition shows 
a negative and significant effect, whereas for the remaining for quintiles the effect is still 
positive. 
                                                 
7 The multivariate dummy that represents the government system is never significant when considered with the 
above variables, and we do not report the estimates.  17
Table 2 – Political competition and income, OECD countries. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
it κ  (Lack of  political 
competition) 
-0.036    
(0.039) 
1.616***     
(0.079) 
1.495***   
(0.005) 
2.578***    
(0.010) 
1.795***   
(0.007) 
1.258***    
(0.014) 
1.719***   
(0.006) 
1.258***    
(0.014) 
 
Fractionalization        1.293***   
(0.006) 
  1.379***    
(0.029) 
1.082***   
(0.002) 
1.379***    
(0.029) 
1.954***    
(0.023) 
Control of all Houses        0.087***    
(0.012) 
0.147***    
(0.019) 
-0.148***    
(0.011) 
  0.148***    
0.011 
0.114***    
(0.014) 
Majoritarian           1.091****   
(0.004) 
1.592***   
(0.008) 
1.111***   
(0.004) 
1.592***   
(0.008) 
1.147***    
(0.010) 
LegOr UK      0.847***   
(0.006) 
         
LegOr GER      0.556***   
(0.005) 
         
LegOr FRA      0.562***   
(0.002) 
         
Openness         0.021***   
(0.001) 




(Lack of) Political 
comp. 1
st quintile  
             -0.020***     
(0.007) 
(Lack of) Political 
comp. 2
nd quintile 
                0.788***    
(0.027) 
(Lack of) Political 
comp. 3
rd quintile 
             1.315***     
(0.014) 
(Lack of) Political 
comp. 4
th  quintile 




         -0.062 
(0.148) 
 
Instrument    Berlin Berlin Berlin Berlin Berlin Berlin Berlin Berlin 
Method  OLS  IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
N  700 700 663 670 665 663 690 663 623 




4.3. Growth equation 
We then consider a dynamic specification of model 1 to verify the effects of political 
competition on per capita income growth. Model 3 proposes a Barro augmented regression, 
that considers, besides the political and institutional variables introduced earlier (vector Z), 
the initial level of output to capture convergence and a vector E of economic indicators, 
including the lagged share of investments over GDP, the share of government spending, and 
openness. The country and year dummies are unchanged. The specification is as follows 
(model 3): 
it t i i it it gy gy ξ θ ϑ γ γ γ κ γ + + + + + + = E Z 4 3 0 2 1        (7) 
This dynamic specification serves two purposes, but must be considered under a caveat. 
The first and main purpose is to difference out any source of unobserved heterogeneity in 
levels of income. The fixed regional effects allows for long-term differences in average 
growth across countries. The second is to consider Solow-style convergence in incomes per 
capita, to rule out that changes in political competition are not picking up the fact that some 
countries grew faster just because they were initially poorer. As for the caveat, 27 years is 
probably too short a period to analyze the dynamics of personal income. There are well-
known issues from dynamic panels with fixed effects, especially when the number of time 
periods is not large. Having flagged these issues, we report the results of the estimates in 
Table 3.  
Column 1 simply estimates the model of growth without political and institutional 
variables. We find evidence of convergence, and that investment and openness have positive 
and significant effect on growth. Including the measure of political competitiveness slightly 
changes the economic results by making government spending significantly negative, but the 
coefficient of political competition is negative but insignificant. In columns 3 through 5 the 
instrument Berlin is added, together with political and institutional variables, and our measure 
of political competition becomes negative and highly significant, again in contrast with the 
standard literature, but consistently with the predictions of our model for national 
governments. Column 6 finds poor evidence of non-linearity between political competition 
and growth, since all quintiles but one are significantly positive. 
 
4.4. Fiscal policy equation 
So far the results indicate that more political competition is associated with lower per 
capita income levels and slower growth. The model predicts that it be the case for national 
government, because the higher salience of ideological issues relatively to the subnational 
governments blunts the swing voters’ responsiveness to the economic performance of the 
government; furthermore, the larger number of policy instruments available at the level of 
national government reduces the tax price of any policy decisions, which allows national 
politicians to use more fiscal resources to buy the votes of the non committed voters. This 
should appear as a positive correlation between political competition and distorsive fiscal 
policies at the level of national governments. To verify whether this is the case, we estimate 
the following model 4:  
it t i it it ψ θ ϑ δ δ κ δ + + + + + = E Z G 3 2 1      ( 8 )  
where the vector Git is composed by real per capita spending of country i in time t in a 
series of government programs specified below, and the left hand side variables are as before. 
In this case we only apply the IV strategy by using the fall of the Berlin Wall as an 




Table 3- Political competition and growth, OECD countries. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
it κ  (Lack of 
political comp.) 
  -0.012     
(0.044) 
0.353***    
(0.064) 
0.409***    
(0.043) 




0.0019***   
(0.0002) 
-
0.0017***   
(0.0002) 
-0.0017*    
(0.0010)    
-0.0021**   
(0.0010) 
-0.009***   
(0.002) 
-0.008***   
(0.001) 
Investment(-1) 0.045**     
(0.014) 
0.023*    
(0.013) 
0.045***    
(0.018) 
0.043***    
(0.017) 





-0.006    
(0.004) 
-0.007*   
(0.003) 
0.006    
(0.005) 
   0.026***   
(0.001) 




0.007**   
(0.003)     




0.003   
(0.0002) 
Fractionalization      -0.419***   
(0.069) 
-0.383***   
(0.067) 
-0.364***   
(0.044) 
-0.163***   
(0.006) 
Control of all 
Houses 
    0.358***    
(0.097) 
0.383***    
(0.087) 
0.556***   
(0.045) 
0.496***   
(0.075) 
Majoritarian       -0.006     
(0.084) 
  0.258***   
(0.005) 
0.254***   
(0.007) 
Eurocom*(Lack 
of) Political comp. 
      0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
 
(Lack of) Political 
comp. 1
st quintile  
      0.008***     
(0.001) 
(Lack of) Political 
comp. 2
nd quintile 
          0.013    
(0.008) 
(Lack of) Political 
comp. 3
rd quintile 
        0.217***     
(0.005) 
(Lack of) Political 
comp. 4
th  quintile 
       0.004***     
(0.012) 
Instrument      Berlin Berlin Berlin Berlin 
Method  OLS  OLS  IV IV IV IV 
N  744 700 623 668 663 623 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. All estimates include time- and country-dummy. 
 
In column 1 we find that government consumption is positively affected by lack of 
political competition. The coefficient is sizable, and highly significant. We also find, in line 
with war of attrition models, that a more fragmented political system induces higher spending. 
Majoritarian voting systems reduce government spending, whereas the higher the share of the 
elderly the higher is public expenditure. Following Rodrick (1998) higher openness to 
international trade is associated with higher government spending as a way to insure against 
external shocks. When we consider other types of government spending, we still find a 
significantly positive effect, but this is reduced in size. This is true for redistributive spending, 










Table 4- Political competition and fiscal policy, OECD countries. 













it κ  (Lack of 
political comp.) 
1.903***     
(0.054) 
0.268***    
(0.006)      
 0.277***   
(0.006)      
0.237***    
(0.009)      
Fractionalization  1.039***      
(0.123) 
0.571*** 
(0.007)      
0.803***    
(0.004)      
0.404***     
(0.011)      
Control of all 
Houses 






-0.080***    
(0.004) 
Majoritarian   -0.402***     
(0.016) 
0.471***    
(0.002)      
0.336***    
(0.048)     
0.461***    









Share of the 
Elderly 
0.732***    
(0.007) 




Instrument Berlin  Berlin Berlin  Berlin 
Method IV  IV  IV  IV 
N 587  422  416  416 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. All estimates include time- and country-dummy. 
 
  5. Empirical analysis, Italian regions 
  The Italian Regions provide an appropriate and interesting testing ground to the theory 
for three main reasons. First, the radical institutional reforms of 1995, which transformed their 
government structure from a parliamentary system elected via proportional representation to 
an effectively presidential one with an electoral system that effectively links the votes to a 
coalition to the preferences for a candidate for the Presidency of the Region are generally 
believed to have produced an upward shift in the competitiveness of Italian regional politics 
(Veronese, 2008). This discontinuity should make it easier to detect evidence of increased 
competition and the changes it induced on policy choices and economic efficiency. Second, 
the Italian regional governments have a limited set of political competencies, which should 
guarantee a fairly tight agency relationship between voters and their representatives. The 
preservation of political rents should therefore be more difficult for incumbent parties and 
politicians and this should foster political competition. Third, the limits in the policy choices 
should make it easier to evaluate their efficiency profile. Hence, in this paper we examine the 
main implications of the Besley et al. (2006) model on a sample of data drawn from the 
Italian Regions for the 1980-2002, centered on the 1995 institutional reform, which becomes 
our instrument as a dummy variable equal to 1 from 1995 to 2000, and 0 in the previous 
period. 
 
5.1. A brief description of Italian Regional politics and institutions 
The Italian Constitution, promulgated in 1948, foresees the principle of decentralization of 
the government functions and the establishment of Regional Governments (Article 5 and Title 
V of the Constitution). Italy has thus been divided into 20 Regions (see Appendix D for the 
list of names and abbreviations). Five of these, the first established between 1948 and 1963, 
enjoy a special statute (Regioni a Statuto Speciale, or RSS), because of their multilingual 
status, borderline position or particularly low level of development. The remaining 15 
Regions, characterized by an ‘ordinary statute’ (Regioni a Statuto Ordinario, or RSO), were 
established in 1970, 22 years after the Constitutional provision.   21
According to the Constitution, the major responsibilities of Regional Governments are 
those of health care and regional administration, plus certain aspects of social services, 
environment, local transportation, housing culture and tourism. The difference between the 
RSO and the RSS lies in the provision of grants from the Central Government, which is much 
more generous for the RSS (Brosio et al., 2003).  
Until the early 1990s, the institutional framework and the politics of the RSO was based on 
proportional representation and on a parliamentary system, with a 5-year renewable tenure for 
Regional legislators. This created lack of accountability, instability of Regional governments 
and a general dissatisfaction with the quality of regional politics. This situation led to an 
important reform (law n. 43/1995) that modified both the electoral system and the length of 
tenure of regional legislators. The mechanism to elect the members of the regional Council 
switched from a pure proportional representation system to a mixed one. Eighty percent of the 
legislators are now elected on the basis of provincial lists and the remaining twenty percent by 
a majoritarian system on the basis of regional lists. Moreover, a top-up for the majority in two 
steps ensures that the absolute majority of the legislators is held by the coalition linked to the 
regional list that obtained the relative majority of the votes. The reform also reduced the 
tenure length of the Council from five to two years if the confidence relationship between the 
Council and the Cabinet breaks down during the first two years. Finally, the President is not 
elected directly but is indicated before the election by the coalition that supports her or him. 
The new electoral rules were first applied in the 1995 regional elections. In 1999, a further 
reform step was introduced: a constitutional law modified the election of the President (art. 
122 of the Constitution), stating that the President of the Regional Government is elected by 
universal and direct suffrage, unless the Regional Statute establishes otherwise. The elected 
President appoints and dismisses the members of the Regional Government. The first direct 
election of the President took place in the regional elections of the year 2000.  
This reform has considerably affected the ways and mores of Italian regional politics. 
Alternation in government, already present, increased significantly in the three elections held 
under the new institutional system. To give an example, in the last electoral round, 5 regions 
out of 20 (Calabria, Lazio, Piemonte, Puglia and Sardegna) swung from a center-right to a 
center-left coalition, a remarkable shift given the traditional stability of Italian politics until 
1995.
8  
Another factor that increased political competition was the dramatic political changes that 
took place in Italy at the beginning of the 1990s, when a wave of corruption scandals swept 
away the pre-existing political parties. Especially at the level of national politics, these parties 
enjoyed large political rents because of the impossibility of the Communist Party to alternate 
in government with the Christian Democrats. Though since 1948 the Communist Party has 
always been the second largest party in Italy, its declared incompatibility with Italy’s 
international alliances made the Communist Party an unreliable member of Italian national 
government. When this stalemate broke down after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was replaced 
by a system of new parties, aggregating into two coalitions, usually called the Polo (Centre-
Right) and the Ulivo (Centre-Left), alternating in government both at the national and at the 
regional level.  
Research about the effects of the 1995 institutional reforms on the competitiveness of 
Italian regional politics and on the economic performance of the Regions is virtually non-
existent. Veronese (2008) tests predictions along the lines of Besley et al. (2006) on data on 
Italian local governments, which underwent a similar move from parliamentarism to 
                                                 
8 In the time-span we consider, among RSOs, two regions in the North (Lombardy and Veneto), four regions in 
the Center (Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Marche and Umbria), and two regions in the South (Campania and 
Basilicata) did not change the ruling coalition.  22
presidentialism in 1993. She finds evidence that the institutional reform generated more 
political competition and greater accountability, measured as an increase in the differentiation 
between the executive and the legislative branch. This differentiation is in turn correlated with 
more, not less, government spending.  
 
5.2. Empirical strategy  
We consider the relationship between political competition, on the one hand, and income 
levels and public spending, on the other. To this end, we use the electoral margin between the 
two largest parties until 1995 elections and the margin between the two coalitions for the 
following elections as the indicator of political competition. We take the 1995 institutional 
reform as the exogenous shock to the political rents that possibly existed during the pre-1995 
parliamentary regime. In this way, political competition is considered as a long-run, structural 
phenomenon, affected by structural events like institutional reforms characterized by 
considerable durability, rather than as the outcome of day-to-day policy struggles or of 
electoral contests. We also resort to fixed effects and year dummies, to get rid of conditioning 
phenomena not directly related with the political competition-economic performance 
relationship, and use a series of control variables to ‘clean’ the estimates as much as possible. 
Finally, given the crucial role of the institutional reform of 1995 in our estimates, we limit the 
sample to the 15 Regions with an Ordinary Statute (RSO), since they were the only ones to be 
affected by the reform. We will thus investigate the link between political competition and 
economic performance by looking at the policy choices of the Regions. To rule out problems 
of reverse causation, we estimate the model using an IV technique, which models political 
competition using drivers that are plausibly independent from economic development.
9 Table 
5 reports the summary statistics of the variables involved in the analysis. Appendix C 
describes the data sources. 
 
Table 5. Summary statistics – Italian Regions sample 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max 
it κ  (lack of political competition, margin seats)  0.216    0.116 0.000 0.500 
it κ  (lack of political competition, margin votes)  0.141    0.107 0.001 0.447 
Election  0.235    0.424 0.000 1.000 
Fractionalization  0.361    0.110 0.178 0.580 
Total gov. expenditures per capita  4294.5  2482.1  0.000  11697 
Health care expenditure per capita  1411.2   494.63  554.85  2540.1 
Expenditures in public admin. per capita  126.33   92.088  27.565  595.97 
Margin Seats 1
st  Quintile  0.153 0.359 0.000 1.000 
Margin Seats 2
nd Quintile  0.212   0.409  0.000  1.000 
Margin Seats 3
rd Quintile  0.427   0.495  0.000  1.000 
Margin Seats 4
th Quintile  0.109   0.303  0.000  1.000 
Margin Seats 5
th  Quintile  0.106 0.308 0.000 1.000 
Margin Votes 1
st  Quintile  0.365 0.481 0.000 1.000 
Margin Votes 2
nd  Quintile  0.294 0.456 0.000 1.000 
Margin Votes 3
rd Quintile  0.251  0.433 0.000 1.000 
Margin Votes 4
th  Quintile  0.031 0.174 0.000 1.000 
Margin Votes 4
th  Quintile  0.059 0.235 0.000 1.000 
                                                 
9 The sample of the Italian Regions does not allow checking the quality of the Presidents as Besley et al. (2006) 
do, namely, interpreting high quality State Governors as those associated with above trend Regional incomes. In 
Italy, the Presidents of the Regions are de facto directly elected since 1995 (de jure since 2000); the short time 
series does not allow enough degrees of freedom for that type of analysis. Data about the expenditure levels of 
Regional spending programs are however available until the year 2000.  23
  
 
5.3. Income levels 
To model the relationship between income levels and political competition, we estimate 
the following model: 
t i t i it it u v y , 2 1 ε α κ α + + + + = Z ,            ( 9 )  
where  it y  is the log of real income per capita in region i at time t,  i v  is a region fixed 
effect,  t u  is a time-dummy, and  it ε  is the error term. Our key variable is  it κ , the indicator of 
political competition, which, in the empirical analysis, is captured by the difference in votes 
between the first and the second largest parties for the elections before 1995, and between the 
winning and the losing coalition for the elections after 1995. Two control variables compose 
the Z vector.
10 First, to verify whether is pre- or post-electoral political competition to matter, 
we estimate equation (5) in terms of both margin of seats held in the Regional Council by the 
winning party and of margin of votes obtained in the elections over the second largest party. 
The first margin captures the ‘parliamentary majority’ of the President and is thus relevant for 
policy decisions; the second more closely proxies his/her electoral base, and can be more 
informative for political decisions, such as whether to compete for another mandate or not. 
Second, as for the OECD sample, we add a political fragmentation variable. All models are 
log linear and coefficients are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by regions that 
allow for region specific serial correlation. 
Column (1) in Table 6 displays estimates of (5) by OLS for annual data between 1980 and 
2002. There is evidence of a weakly significant (10% level) negative correlation between 
political competition, measured in terms of seat margins, and income per-capita. This result is 
not conclusive, because the coefficient α1 gives us the causal effect of political competition on 
yit as long as  it κ  is uncorrelated with  it ε . In the context of our analysis, this condition may 
fail because of omitted factors influencing both economics and politics. The institutional 
reform of 1995 may have destroyed pre-existing political rents and increased competition 
because under the new system voters felt that they could ‘choose’ the Regional government 
instead of seeing it emerge from party politics, as it was the case under the previous 
institutional framework. The disappearance of the old political parties and the (slow) 
emergence of the two new coalitions might have contributed to reinforce political 
competition: average voting turnout of regional elections in fact increased after 1995. At the 
same time, the new political setup emerging after the wave of scandals of the early 1995 
could have reduced corruption and liberated resources to be invested in the productive sectors, 
thereby raising output independently, although there is no decisive evidence of such an 
outcome (Golden and Picci, 2005).  
Furthermore, as already pointed out, it could also be the case that higher income 
stimulates political competition, thereby rising problems of reverse causation. To solve these 
potential problems, we resort to an IV strategy. We instrument political competition by 
introducing a dummy for the 1995 year, which takes the value of 0 before and 1 afterwards. 
This dummy captures both the institutional reform of 1995 and the fact that the ensuing 
Regional elections were contested by two coalitions of parties organized before the elections, 
instead of a constellation of parties that form the governing and opposing coalitions after the 
elections. These changes are plausibly independent of economic change.  
                                                 
10 We have tried a battery of control variables, including government partisanship, the ratio between the transfers 
received from the central government and the Region’s total revenues, as well as other specification of the 
electoral budget cycle. We report only those who more consistently turn out significant in the analysis.  24
Table 6 - Political competition and personal income, Italian regions 
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(0.144) 
N  255 255 255 255 255 255 
Estimation  method  OLS IV OLS IV  IV  IV 
Instrument   D1995  D1995  D1995  D1995 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. All estimates include time- and region-dummy. 
 
Given the nature of the variables (lower margins indicate greater competition) this bias 
may be responsible for the “wrong” sign obtained in OLS estimates. We thus consider a first-
stage equation: 
it t i it d s r η β κ + + + = 1995 1          ( 1 0 )  
where  i r  is a region fixed effect and  t s  a year fixed effect. The instruments d1995 is a 
year dummy that discriminates between elections before and after 1995. Results from the IV 
version corresponding to (5), using (6) as the first stage, are found in column (2). The 
estimated α1 coefficient in this case is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that in 
the new institutional setting, increased political competition has a positive casual effect on 
regional per capita income. The change of coefficient from the OLS to the IV estimates seems 
to be attributable to the bias in the OLS estimates of column (1). The estimates of columns (3) 
and (4) repeat the same exercise, with quite similar result, using votes’ margins as the 
indicator of political competition. The OLS estimated coefficient α1 is not statistically 
significant, while the IV one has the correct sign and is significant at the 1% level. Post 
electoral politics seems to matter more in terms of economic performance, because the sign of 
the α1 coefficient in column (2), where  it κ  is estimated in terms of seat margins, is 40% larger 
than that of column (4), where  it κ  is in terms of vote margins. Policies seem to affect regional 
personal income more than political circumstances. The estimates reveal evidence of war of 
attrition among the parties that support the regional government (the coefficient on  25
fractionalization is always negative and statistically significant in the IV estimates), as well as 
of a political business cycle: electoral years coincide with above average levels of per capita 
income. Finally, the relationship between political competition and economic performance 
may be nonlinear. To test for it, we divide the vote and seat margins in quintiles and 
categorize the Regions by means of a dummy variable that equals 1 if the Region belongs to 
that quintile and 0 otherwise. The first quintile includes the largest margins (lowest 
competition), the fifth the smallest ones and is used as intercept benchmark in the estimates. 
Columns (5) and (6) report the results for seats and votes margins, respectively. Nonlinearity 
seems more pronounced in the case of votes (column 6) than of seats (column 5), where 
nonlinearity is determined only by the effects of Regions in the lowest quintiles. The switch 
from the continuous variable to the dummies does not affect the signs and size of the 
coefficients of the other regressors.  
 
5.4. Fiscal policy 
So far the results indicate that more political competition is associated with higher 
income levels and growth. Now we must examine whether this correlation is due to more 
efficiently-oriented policy choices of the Regional governments.  
As noted in Section 3, Italian Regions have the main responsibility of two spending 
programs, health care and regional administration. They share the responsibility of efficiency-
augmenting programs, such as transport and education, with other government levels. In the 
spirit of the model, we focus our attention on the two programs for which the responsibility 
can be more directly and exclusively attributed to the Regional governments. As neither of 
these programs directly stimulates economic performance, rather are characterized by high 
levels of waste and pork-barrel spending, we reinterpret the prediction of the model 
postulating that tighter political competition should be associated with lower spending in 
healthcare and even more in regional administration. In other words, high quality politicians 
signal their competence by reducing waste in healthcare spending and by streamlining the 
regional bureaucracy, and vice versa. To gauge some information about the other programs, 
we test the implications of the model on total regional spending as well. As already explained 
in section 3, the institutional reforms of the 1995 and 2001 expanded the set of responsibilities 
of the Regions in the second half of the sample, which should result in an upward shift of the 
intercept of public spending. The IV estimates, instrumenting for the 1995 reform, should 
capture this effect and still yield unbiased estimates. 
The model that we estimate is specified as follows: 
it t i it it u v ψ δ κ δ + + + + = Z G 2 1         ( 1 1 )  
where the vector Git is composed by total real per capita spending of Region i in time 
t, real spending per capita in healthcare, and real spending per capita in administration. Table 
7 reports the IV results for the three dependent variables in column (1), (2) and (3), 
respectively,
11 where  it κ  is expressed in terms of seat margins, and in column (4), (5) and (6), 
where  it κ  in expressed in terms of vote margins.  
The bottom line is that tighter political competition does decrease public spending per 
capita, both in total terms and for what it concerns spending for health care and for regional 
administration. Because of the presence of waste, rent seeking, pork barrel and common pool 
situations in Italian government spending, this result runs is consistent with the prediction of 
                                                 
11 We have estimated also the OLS specification and found the same downward bias detected in the regression 
for the income levels, most likely due to the same reasons. We have  therefore omitted reporting the OLS 
estimates.   26
Besley et al. (2006), that more competition promotes efficiency enhancing policies. Regional 
fixed effects rule out the possibility that the estimates of equation (8) are due to the level of 
economic development of the Region or to any other Region specific factor. Year fixed effect 
deprive the estimates of the influence of the business cycle. The other regressors included in 
the Z vector are also in line with theory. Electoral years are characterized by higher spending 
and more fragmented coalitions tend to spend more to solve problems of war of attrition. In 
the two programs of public expenditures on which Regional governments have a more direct 
control the  1 δ coefficient on seat margin is larger than on vote margins: 15% larger in the case 
of health care and almost 60% in the case of public administration. These results are 
consistent with the idea that waste characterizes these programs; they are also plausible, as the 
size of the coefficient is larger where the Regional government has a more direct 
responsibility. Finally, they suggest that the reform of 1995 strengthened the control of the 
President of the Region over his majority, thereby creating incentives for the delivery of more 
efficiency oriented policy choices. 
 
Table 7- Political competition and fiscal policy, Italian regions 
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1093.419***   
(31.217)      
-
702.061***   
(31.684)     
-
179.653***   
(32.094)    
   





     -
1565.78***   
(123.783) 
-
613.295***   
(20.851) 
-
113.017***   
(34.822)     
Election  678.196***    
(70.100)      
230.576***   
(55.164)     
25.987***    
(3.104)     
811.434***   
(68.27)     
276.119***   
(44.397)     
33.2336***   
(12.646)     
Fractionali
zation 
523.84***     
(74.683) 
167.30***    
(19.612) 
86.617***    
(13.746) 
508.454***   
(110.306)    
195.44***    
(8.643)      
57.630***    
(8.998)     
N  255  243 244 255 243 244 
All estimates are obtained by the IV method, with D1995 as instrument. Numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All estimates 
include time- and region-dummy. 
 
6. Conclusions 
  In this paper we have tested the main predictions of Besley et al. (2006) in a context as 
close as possible to the theoretical model, to verify its ability to explain situations other than 
the development of the Southern States of the U.S. In many ways the Italian Regions 
underwent a similar historical evolution, as the institutional reforms of 1995 and the changes 
of the political actors of the early 1990s destroyed political rents and provided a one and for 
all stimulus to political competition, just like the Right to Vote Acts of 1965-1970 did in the 
American South. This ensures that in both contexts political competition is interpreted in 
terms of long run structural events, not as short run electoral outcomes, a relevant feature that 
is often missing in the empirical literature related to the model of Besley et al. (2006). The 
remaining institutional differences that remain between the Italian regions and U.S. States are  27
a test for the generality of the theory. The estimates generally lend empirical support to the 
predictions of the theory. There is evidence of a positive correlation between political 
competition and economic performance of the Italian Regions, as well as of that more 
political competition forces Regional governments to make efficiency-enhancing policy 
choices.   
The current panorama of the empirical literature sees the theory of Besley et al. (2006) 
being confirmed at the level of sub-central governments in various contexts – the U.S. States, 
the Flemish municipalities (Ashworth et al., 2006), and now the Italian Regions – but not at 
the level of national governments. There, in a panel of OECD countries, Padovano and 
Ricciuti (2007) find evidence that greater political competition is correlated with an increase 
of short-term, redistributive policy choices, aimed at buying votes, which depress economic 
performance.  
This dichotomy of empirical findings suggests that future research should move along 
two avenues. The first is to insist in the empirical analysis, to verify that the dichotomy persist 
when new samples are examined and other testing procedures are explored. The second 
avenue is theoretical, as it departs from the acceptance of the dichotomy and moves towards a 
more articulate description of the link between political competition and economic 
performance. In other words, the link evidenced by Besley et al. (2006) might hold in certain 
institutional contexts, but could be less relevant in others, i.e., it might be institutions 
sensitive. This might explain why at the level of national governments greater political 
competition seems to stimulate less efficiency-oriented fiscal policies, but at the level of sub-
central governments it does not. This may be due to a variety of factors, one being that there 
are tighter constraints on the discretionary power of politicians of sub-central governments, in 
the forms of yardstick competition, of tighter control from higher government levels, of a 
more limited set of competencies that reduces voters’ information costs, or of a lower salience 
of ideological issues. Another may be that national governments have a wider array of 
competencies, which multiply the number of dimensions along which parties and candidates 
may compete and exchange in order to stifle political competition. In other words, national 
political markets are closer to a setting of monopolistic competition whereas sub-national 
ones are closer to perfect competition. Be that as it may, in that  it κ  there seems to be more 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
As  Hcc is negative, we get a savings function,  ) (βτ K k
I = , which defines per capita 
investment as a declining function of the overall tax incidence on the new sector. As  0 < kk Q , 
however, per capita investment in the traditional sector is an increasing function of the tax 
pressure on the new sector,  ) (βτ
T T K k = . Moreover, this implies that the quasi-rents to the 
owners of the traditional factor  ) ), ( ( ) ( l K Q R
T
l βτ βτ =  are an increasing function of the tax as 
0 > lk Q . Substituting this information into the utility function 
I V  yields 
) )( ( ) ( ) ( l l R F V
I I − + = βτ βτ βτ , where  ) (βτ F  is defined as 
) ), ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ) ( 1 l K Q K K A K y H F
T T βτ βτ βτ βτ βτ + − + − =   and where we have used the 
per capita budget constraint:  )) ( ) ( ( βτ βτ βτ
T K K A f − = . The expression  ) (βτ F  is the 
indirect utility of a hypothetical person, who owns the average per capita amount of the 
traditional asset. The indirect utility function V
I illustrates the conflict of interest between 
owners of the traditional asset and owners of the new asset. Since  0 ) 0 ( = τ F  and  0 ) 0 ( > τ R , 
those who own an amount of the traditional asset above the mean prefer a strictly positive 
value of βτ , even though a positive tax pressure depresses the return to capital. The 
utilitarian optimum is to set  0 = τ , as average utility has a maximum at the point  0 = τ (see 





The preferences of an elected President, at the point where he sets policy, can thus be written 
as  Δ + − + + − = Δ + − + + = M t q l R F M t q V t q V
K α ρ βτ βτ α ρ βτ βτ ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) , , ( . The 
party share of transfers is split equally between members. Let the number of party members 
(in each party) be mM with  ) 1 ( 2
1 σ − < m  and denote the average quality of party members by 
q
P. Parties maximize the indirect utility of the average member under the hypothesis that 







APPENDIX C: DATA SOURCES 
 
Economic data for the OECD countries are taken from Penn World Tables, Release 6.2. 
Political data are from Database of Political Institutions, while data about the level and 
composition of public spending are from Perrson and Tabellini (2003), downloadable from 
www.igier.unibocconi.it. Economic data for the Italian Regions are drawn from the CRENOS 
database (www.crenos.it) and ISTAT, (ISTAT (various years) I Conti Economici delle 
Regioni, Roma ISTAT). Data on political results are from the database of Ministero 
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APPENDIX D: LIST AND TYPE OF STATUTE OF THE ITALIAN REGIONS 
 
N. AREA NAME  STATUTE 
1 North Val  d’Aosta  Special 
2 North Piedmont  Ordinary 
3 North Lombardy  Ordinary 
4 North Trentino-Alto  Adige Special 
5 North Veneto  Ordinary 
6 North Liguria  Ordinary 
7 North Friuli-Venezia  Giulia Special 
8 Center  Emilia  Romagna  Ordinary 
9 Center  Toscana  Ordinary 
10 Center Marche  Ordinary 
11 Center Umbria  Ordinary 
12 Center Lazio  Ordinary 
13 Center Abruzzo  Ordinary 
14 South  Campania  Ordinary 
15 South  Molise  Ordinary 
16 South  Puglia  Ordinary 
17 South  Basilicata  Ordinary 
18 South  Calabria  Ordinary 
19 South  Sicilia  Special 
20 South  Sardinia  Special 
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